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NRO & USAF REVIEWS COMPLETED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Research

SUBJECT

: OXCART Security

1. In anticipation of expanded LRI and/or RS efforts in the KEDLOCK program, interested OSA components met on 27 August 1962 to consider the impact such expansion would have upon OXCART security. Those present at the meeting generally agreed to the following conclusions.

- A. Certain critical aspects of the OXCART program must not be compromised as a consequence of expanded KEDLOCK programs. Among these critical aspects are the following.
 - (i) CIA sponsorship of OXCART.
 - (2) Radar cross section reduction techniques and achievements.
 - (3) Existence of an A-12 as a photographic reconnaissance vehicle.
 - (4) OXCART operational concepts, command lines and procedures, i.e. Z I based operations, air-to-air refueling from advanced bases and radar suppression.
 - (5) Performance characteristics of the A-12 as they may differ from other versions, i.e. range, altitude and speeds.
 - (6) Camera and other special equipments development.
 - (7) OXCART covert contracting mechanisms.
 - (8) OXCART operational pilot status.

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ac) Agency communications procedures. (a) facilities and procedures such as navigational de, frequencies, approach control, etc.
annou	ertain problems which will emerge when a public neement concerning KEDLOCK is made were also lered.
(1) How is sole source procurement explained?
	Who authorized funds to be expended and from what ource did the funds come?
	What authority has been responsible for contracting, echnical supervision and audit?
(4	i) How has the program developed to its present state ithout it becoming public knowledge?
other reali from	he magnitude of the problems outlined above, and certainly swhich have not occurred to us, cannot be assessed stically until more definitive information is forthcoming the DOD and USAF. Specific questions which have a ng follow:
) How many additional aircraft and what version or ersions will be purchased?
(i	2) What is the future of the B-70/RS-70?
-	3) What are the delivery schedules of additional LRI or (S-12 aircraft?
•	4) Who will be responsible for overt contracting?

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(5) Will aircraft be operated from other bases?

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procurement of RS-12's or additional advantage of the Agency a for the DOP flight test program a lif this reasoning is followed, we to a public explanation for the emandation of the provide a recoverable first standitionary applications. Furtherm would help to divert attention to the activity applications. If the foregon construction now planned of the A-12 to the personnel now plant test of the LRI could be avoided. 3. In summation, we find our	would tend to give greater credence bergence of an advanced LRI or gical advances in the basic program age booster led to these additional ore, such a course of action he LRI or RS and away from the sing is the approved approach, could be curtailed, and exposure programmed for flight flight flight. reselves in the position of attempting he absence of essential information aningful. Our only positive we protect to the greatest degree CART program as enumerated in
	JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR. Acting Assistant Director (Special Activities)
EO/OSA: (30 Aug 1962)	
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